"The US Navy is aggressively pursuing a radically new 'in-stride' concept in mine countermeasures to support its expeditionary doctrine. One important lesson re-learned from the 1990-1991 Gulf War was the threat posed by sea mines to maritime expeditionary forces. The US Navy (USN) Aegis cruiser USS Princeton was severely damaged by an Italian-made Manta influence mine, while the assault ship USS Tripoli sustained serious damage after striking an old-fashioned LUGM 145 horned-mine (This USD 1,900 weapon caused USD 5 million worth of damage to the Tripoli). The humble mine, with its low cost and high disruptive potential, continues to be of constant concern to any maritime commander venturing into the confines of the littoral. Cheep to produce and easy to lay, its asymmetric ability to inflict major damage and significant casualties can deny access to an amphibious task force and thereby prevent timely 'bridging' of the sea-to-shore gap. Mine countermeasures (MCM) have therefore become critical to the USN's ability to effectively control, shape and dominate the littoral battlespace. This ability not only includes locating and neutralizing mines, but also identifying those areas where mines are not present. Seven different equipment programmes currently constitute the USN's organic MCM programme, with the intention to progressively introduce 'in-stride' detection and clearance capability to the fleet from 2005. They are: Detection AN/AQS-20X airborne mine hunting sonar. AN/AES-1 airborne laser mine detection system. AN/WLD-1 (v) I remote mine hunting system. AN/BLQ-11 long-term mine reconnaissance system. Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep. Clearance Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS). Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS). Accession No.1159 Scott, R. 'MO2015 charts path for future MCM.' Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 34, issue 5, 2 August 2000, pp. 27-29. A NATO study has outlined a future vision for naval mine countermeasures (MCM) that will see advanced unmanned vehicles and large command-and-control ships playing an increasingly important role. It has also underlined a continued need for dedicated MCM assets,noting that organic or 'in-stride' systems 'will not be able to meet the majority needs.' Eight MCM capability shortfalls were defined. The problems were: Drifting mines. Short-tethered mines in deeper water. Safe minehunting. MCM in shallow water/in-stride with amphibious forces. Buried mines. Concealed mines. Covert reconnaissance; and mines containing range-detection firing systems." Accession No.1160. Brown, N. 'What lies beneath.' Jane's Navy International, vol.***, issue***, June 2003, pp. 14-21. "Sea mines remain a dangerous and supremely cost-effective threat to maritime expeditionary operations. One of the most high-profile military endeavours during the recent US-led coalition operations against Iraq was the operation to secure access to the port of Umm Qasr. In the absence of any conventional threat from the air or from Iraq's devastated navy, foremost in the minds of the coalition joint maritime commanders was the experience of the 1990-1991 Gulf War when two major US Navy (USN) vessels USS Princeton and USS Tripoli, were extensively damaged by mines. Sea mines are one of the most cost-effective means of waging naval warfare and it is easy to see their attraction. Cheap to acquire and easy to deploy, even the most crude floating mines can pose a serious threat to shipping. There are two broad categories of mine, namely ground mines that sit on the sea bed, and moored mines, which have an anchoring body that sits on the bottom (while the active part of the mine floats above, tethered at a set depth). These categories divide further into a variety of types, depending on their triggering fuse mechanism and the effect that this has."